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We analyze, both theoretically and empirically, the influence of direct democratic institutions on the size and development of shadow economies. Our model suggests that, as the extent of direct democracy increases, implemented fiscal policies more nearly reflect the preferences of citizens and so reduce their incentives to operate in the informal sector. This theory implies a negative relationship between the extent of direct democracy and the size of the country's shadow economy. We also theorize that direct democracy has a greater effect in reducing the informal sector when the former is at low or intermediate values and when the electoral system is characterized by a larger district magnitude. An empirical investigation of a sample of 57 democracies confirms our model's predictions.

In this paper we analyze the influence of direct democratic institutions on the size and development of the shadow economies. The framework developed predicts a negative relationship between the degree of direct democracy and the size of the shadow economy. Countries where direct democratic institutions support democratic life are expected to be characterized by a lower informal sector, ceteris paribus. The empirical / econometric investigation of a sample of 56 democracies confirms our core hypothesis and demonstrates that the effect of direct democratic institutions on the shadow economy is negative and quantitatively important; the results are robust and also depend on the interaction of direct democracy with other political institutions, such as district magnitude.

ABSTRACTThis paper studies the effects of mobilization for war on the development of fiscal capacity and the values of tax compliance (tax morale). We propose a dynamic setting where governments may invest resources to improve the efficiency of the fiscal apparatus and the citizens' tax morality in order to raise the necessary revenues for the defense against a threat (external or internal), and parents optimally choose to transmit their preferences of tax compliance to children. Despite fiscal capacity and tax morale are initially substitutes, we show how a dynamic complementarity may arise in equilibrium from a more efficient transmission of the values of tax compliance in countries with high fiscal capacity, and this may explain why they tend to move together over time. Under reasonable conditions, we obtain that the effect of a higher threat of war on the steady‐state level of the culture of tax compliance is negative when fiscal capacity is relatively low, and positive when the latter is large. We show cross‐country evidence based on war frequency, fiscal capacity, and tax morale that is consistent with the results of our theory.

Il presente lavoro discute gli effetti delle regole costituzionali sulle politiche fiscali e analizza come alcuni fattori economici possano, a loro volta, influenzare la scelta delle regole costituzionali stesse. In particolare, il lavoro si focalizza su due istituzioni specifiche: la forma di governo e il sistema elettorale. Dopo averne analizzato gli effetti sulle politiche fiscali e, di conseguenza, sulla distribuzione del reddito della società, l'articolo presenta i meccanismi attraverso i quali la disuguaglianza del reddito possa influenzare, a sua volta, la scelta delle regole costituzionali stesse. Infine, si illustrano alcuni casi storici di scelte costituzionali coerenti con la teoria da noi esposta. This paper discusses the effects of constitutional rules on fiscal policies and how some economic fundamentals can in turn affect the choice of such rules. In particular, the paper focuses on two specific institutions: the form of government and the electoral system. We present the effects of these institutions on fiscal policies and, therefore, on income distribution; then, we illustrate the mechanisms through which income inequality affects the choice of constitutions. Finally, some historical cases of constitutional choice are presented.

This paper studies how mobilization for war motivates citizens to contribute to their own community and therefore help forming tax morale in a constituency. We derive a theoretical model to investigate government's decision to expand tax revenues from alternative sources, namely changing the country's culture of tax compliance or expanding fiscal capacity. Despite the two are initially substitute, we show how in equilibrium dynamic complementarity arises. Our mechanism exploits exogenous variation in the cost of tax morale formation, induced by an expected war (either internal or external) that makes easier for the government to mobilize the constituency. We motivate our theory through a novel cross-country analysis that uses information on war frequency, tax morale, and fiscal capacity. We additionally discuss some historical cases consistent with our mechanism.

This paper analyzes the relationship between individuals' aversion to ethnic diversity, the degree of fiscal and political decentralization, and tax morale. Our theory is based on the assumption that individuals are risk averse in contributing to the provision of public goods benefiting other ethnic groups, and threfore display a lower tax morale. We find scope for policy intervention-specifically, our model predicts that the effect of individuals' aversion to ethnic diversity on taxmorale is smaller or null in decentralized political and fiscal systems relative to centralized ones. The theory highlights the role of decentralization reforms to cut down inter-ethnic redistribution in con icting environments. We test our results by using individual data from the World Value Survey, and several decentralization measures from Fan et al. (2009). According to our most preferred estimation, a one-scale change in the attitude toward ethnic diversity reduces tax morale of 0.03 in centralized system. We rather find no impact in decentralized states.

AbstractThis paper investigates the effects of a retreat from global economic integration on the European regional production network for the period 2000–2010. We find that production has become increasingly fragmented, although the degree of heterogeneity across regions is substantial. This heterogeneity is also present in the direct and indirect effects of three different deglobalisation scenarios that we simulate. Our results show that deglobalisation generates winners and losers. Specifically, two groups of regions emerge; regions that would benefit from a return to a less integrated world, and regions that would instead gain from a strengthening of the European production network.